终于在无数次不走心的看了一半又放弃的情况下又重新捡起来，加上一些补充的背景知识，终于从这部纪录片里学到了很多知识，马克一下。
1. 第一层级的关于08年金融危机的粗浅认知：
home buyers->lenders->investment banks->investors
在一个正常市场上，人们在有能力偿还的前提下挑选合适的房子，付3-8成的首付，剩下的钱跟机构贷款，按照商量好的利率，分成20-30年的周期慢慢把钱还给贷款机构/lenders。lenders想要提前收钱，于是把贷款卖给ib. ib把手头有的这些笔贷款整一整，打包成不同的cdo发行，只要看上去不是太烂的都让评级机构给打a，实在无药可救的也就没办法只能给b和c了。不过事实上，最后95%的cdo最后评级出来都是a以上。
片子里说的很清楚了，因为cdo本身可以带来比房贷利率更高的收益率+3a的溢价，ib是很乐意推销cdo赚钱的，lender因为可以立马转手卖掉刚放出去的贷款所以也不在乎偿付能力，所以结果就是需要很多贷款来构建cdo，标准越来越低，阿猫阿狗都可以以5%的首付买一套房。房价越来越高，居民负债越来越高，泡沫慢慢起来了。房价涨的时候当然一片欣欣向荣，毕竟买房等于捡钱，砸锅卖铁也要还房贷。但是当标准越来越低，甚至用一只狗的名字去申请贷款也能秒批的时候，违约率悄然升高，马上就要到一个可以导致房价下跌的turning point了。
房价下跌，违约率滚雪球增大，没有人还款，cdo变成废纸一堆，买了cdo的各路养老基金欲哭无泪。
2.第二层的在简单逻辑背后的一些细节：
片子里面有句话大概是说，每次危机来临之前，金融产品的复杂性和诈骗比例总是很高的。从诈骗这点来看，片子里举的那对不会说英语的墨西哥夫妇遇到高利贷lender的case感觉不是很典型，大空头里面现场调研房产经纪人说借款人没有收入也没关系，反正都能过审核，反正转头就能卖给投行了，这个case在某种程度上是更加典型的风控缺失诱使社会钻空子。
不过纪录片里好像没有涉及到利率上浮的事情，也许利率上浮更像是一个外生变量而不是一个锅所以纪录片就没有提了吧。总之如果说利率上浮不是造成雪崩的决定性原因，也算是很重的一根稻草了，大空头里面经纪人说make 2k on a fix-rate prime,but can make 10k on a subprime adjustable。这样想想要你是经纪人你也劝客户贷浮动利率，但是大空头里面mark对stripper说的if home prices isn't go up, you're unable to make refinance,monthly payment would increase even double.这些风险揭露显然是不受放贷机构欢迎的。关于利率上浮，初衷可能是为了抑制经济过热，但是没想到加速了爆炸。有点像油锅起火往里面倒了一杯水一样，关键还是上层的大人物们没搞清底层的真实情况吧。
搜到了一段关于放贷机构如何堕落的描述，不过confuse的地方在于fanny和freddie不是自己也倒下去了么...
原先在美国次级贷款市场占七成份额的房利美和房地美公司，由政府机构主宰，将贷款打包成证券，承诺投资者能够获得本金和利率。随着这两家公司的丑闻爆出，政府对两家公司的业务增长加以限制，整个次贷市场开始争抢这两家公司所购贷款。整个过程中，新的市场参与者，出于逐利目的，过分追求高风险贷款。当房利美和房地美还占房贷市场主导地位时，他们通常会制定明确的放贷标准，严格规定哪些类型的贷款可以发放。时至今日，由于全球成千上万高风险偏好的对冲基金、养老金基金以及其它基金投资者的介入，原有的放贷标准在高额利率面前成为一纸空文，新的市场参与者与华尔街经销商不断鼓励放贷机构，尝试不同贷款类型。许多放贷机构甚至不要求次级贷款借款人，提供包括税收表格在内的财务资质证明，做房屋价值评估时，放贷机构也更多依赖机械的计算机程序，而不是评估师的结论，潜在的风险就深埋于次级贷款市场中了。
--------以下待整理-------
3.第三层，高级的cds终于出场：
狂记笔记如下：
- investment banks borrowing heavily to buy more loans and create more cdos. when they running out loans, they were filling the bonds with risker mortages (subprime bonds)
AIG were selling huge amount of credit default swaps.
for investors who owns cdos, cds worked like an insurance policy. an investor who purchase a cds, paid AIG a quarterly premium, if the cdos went bad, AIG promised to pay the investors for their losses.
But unlike regular insurances, speculators could also buy cdss from AIG, in order to bet against cdos they didn't own. since the des were unregulated, AIG didn't have to put aside any money to cover potential losses. instead, AIG paid its employees huge cash bonus, as soon as contract was signed. but if the cdos later went bad, AIG would be on the hook.(一般的保险建立在保费略高于赔偿金*出事概率的基础上，这种类似于巨灾保险，怎么会不预备计提损失...)
AIG financial product division in london issued $50b worth of cdss during the bubble, many of them for cdos backed by subprime mortgages.
第四层，cds加杠杆：
by late 2006, gs not only sell these toxic cdos, it started betting against them at the same time it was telling custormers that they were high-quality investments. by purchasing cds from aig, goldman could bet against cdos it didn't own and get paid when the cdos failed.
goldman brought at least $22b cds from aig, it was so large that goldman itself realized that aig might go bankrupt, so they spend $150m insuring themselves against aig's potential collapse.
then in 2007, gs went even furthur, they start to sell cdos that was specifiedly designed so that the more money their customers lost, the more money gs made. (boy, that timberwolf was one shitty deal. 然而高盛总共卖了600m usd的timberwolf)
blankfein in the context of market making, it's ok to sell some shit to investors.
hedge fund manager john paulson made $12b bet against the mortgage market, when he ran out of mortgage securities to bet against, he worked with gs and db to create more of them.
(bruce miller & mark baum)
morgan stanley was also selling mortgage securities it was betting against, being sued by 养老基金.
“我赌我的投资全部亏掉，以获得保险赔偿”
they tend to sell options very cheap when market think it won't happen.
----高级的cdo
cdo square
synthetic cdos: cdo made up of cdos, bet from sidebars. 总池子大概是账面价值的20倍，50m可以撬动10亿资金
第5层，崩溃：
最后的狂欢：房屋违约率大涨，cdo价格还是不变，大空头等的很焦急，margin call忙着rolling cdos
2008年3月，bearsterm就出事了，雷曼9月才倒，之后才是全球金融危机。
by 2008, home foreclosures were skyrocketting and the securitization food chain imploded. lenders could no longer sell their loans to the ibs,a dn as the loans went bad, dozens of lenders failed.
aig bail out, the bail out legislation does nothing to stop the tide of layoffs and foreclosures.
雷曼倒闭了，monetary market collapsed, commercial paper market collapsed, in which many company relied on to pay their operational fees, such as payroll.
the hedge funds who had had assets with lehman in london discovered overnight, to their complete horror, they couldn't get those assets back.
as the end of the day, the poorest always pays the most.
recession怎么来的： trust / lehman hub broken / can't stop foreclosures
第6层，买单：
AIG bailed out, gs were paid $62b the next day.
7000亿的法案通过，最后cost taxpayers over $150b, $14b to gs.
henry paulson/ ben bernanke
geithner/tricadia/lurry summers
第7层，追责：
学术界<->产业界<->政府
lobby to relax limits on leverage
none of these securities got issued without the seal of approval of the rating agencies.
solors: deregulation had tremendous financial and intellectual support, because people argue it for their own benefit. the economics profession was the main source of that illusion.
lecg/analysis group, that provides academic experts for hire. pms aquitted.
学术界的prudential，academic conflicts of interest
mishkin 抓学者比抓产业界的容易多了
第8层，反思：
imf chief economist RAGHURAM RAJAN <has financial development made the workd risker?>
more profits with more risks. raj's paper focused on incentive structures that generated huge cash bonus based on short-term profits, but which impose no penalties for longer losses. what you need do is to compensate for risk-adjustment performances.
allen sloan oct-2007 fortune <the house of junks -- a close-up of one deal shows how subprime mortgages went bad>
第9层，终极答案：
without a good system, doomed???
kind of evolution
小布什政府，加剧贫富差距还鼓励人们借钱买房，长短期的利益？拿什么还？
凯恩斯大战哈耶克xxxxxxx
08年金融危机实录
